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Should the Supreme Court Read The
Federalist but Not Statutory
Legislative History?
William N. Eskridge, Jr.*
A key doctrinal debate in statutory interpretation today revolves around
the claim that courts should almost never consult and never rely on internal
"legislative history" when they construe statutes.' A key doctrinal debate in
constitutional interpretation today revolves around the claim that courts are
bound by the original understanding of the Framers when they construe the
Constitution.2 An oddity about these parallel debates is that the Supreme
Court Justices most critical of considering pre-enactment legislative debates
in statutory cases are the most insistent that ratification debates be consid-
ered, and often be decisive, in constitutional cases. Those Justices are
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas, semanticists in statutory cases, but his-
toricists in constitutional cases. 3 In contrast, Justices John Paul Stevens, San-
dra Day O'Connor, and David Souter examine historical debating materials
in both kinds of cases.
Justices Scalia and Thomas operate under an approach to public law that
is philosophically positivist and doctrinally textualist. They claim that courts
are duty-bound to apply the plain meaning of statutory and constitutional
texts, and not to depart one iota from their commands, even when to do so
would appear fair and just. Because theirs is a freshly articulated and innova-
* Professor of Law, Georgetown Law Center. I am grateful to Stephen Williams, John
Manning, and Ira Lupu for their oral comments on this paper at The George Washington Law
Review's Symposium on Textualism and the Constitution, and to Robert Condlin, William Reyn-
olds, Jana Singer, Marley Weiss, and other participants at a University of Maryland School of
Law workshop where I presented an earlier draft of this article. This article does not respond to
the written commentaries by Williams, Manning, and Lupu, however.
1 Antonin Scalia, Common Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATrER OF Ir.ERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND Tm LAw 3, 16-23, 29-37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
2 See id. at 37-47.
3 Although this Article treats Justices Scalia and Thomas as agreeing on the general
precepts in text, they are not in full agreement, as Judge Stephen Williams pointed out at the
Symposium on Textualism and the Constitution at the George Washington University Law
School. Audio tape of Symposium on Textualism and the Constitution, held by The George
Washington Law Review (Feb. 13-14, 1998) (on file with The George Washington Law Review).
Justice Thomas, for example, does not join Justice Scalia's insistence that legislative history be
expunged completely from public law. See, e.g., Lexicon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Lynes &
Lerach, 66 U.S.L.W. 4158, 4159 n.* (U.S. Mar. 3, 1998) (No. 96-1482) (Justice Thomas, but not
Justice Scalia, joining the Court's discussion of legislative history); National Credit Union Ad-
min. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 66 U.S.L.W. 4134, 4135 n.* (U.S. Feb. 25, 1998) (Nos. 96-
843 and 96-847) (Justice Thomas authoring footnote discussing legislative history which Justice
Scalia refused to join). Notably, Justice Scalia, but not Justice Thomas, declined to join that part
of the Court's opinion in City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), that discussed the
drafting history of the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 2164-66 (holding the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act to exceed Congress's enforcement powers).
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tively defended version of a traditional approach to law, I refer to these Jus-
tices as the "new textualists."14 Although their approach to public law is
unquestionably text-based, Justices Scalia and Thomas freely recognize that
context is important to the proper interpretation of text. The puzzle posed
by this Article is that the new textualists, particularly Justice Scalia, refuse to
consider the debating history of statutes as relevant context but do consider
such history of the Constitution and its amendments, sometimes in great de-
tail.5 Because the new textualists are formalists, the apparent incoherence of
this use of context requires particular justification. The remainder of the Ar-
ticle is an examination of possible justifications.
For example, Justice Scalia argues that The Federalist can inform consti-
tutional interpretation by enabling judges to understand the context in which
the Constitution was adopted. The Federalist, however, may not be taken as
authoritative statements of the Framers' intent. Because received meaning
(the original understanding, which in Justice Scalia's view is appropriate) is
hard to distinguish in practice from intended meaning (intent, which Justice
Scalia views as inappropriate), this distinction is not practically useful. Nor
does this argument distinguish constitutional drafting and debating history
from statutory drafting and debating history.6 Both kinds of debating history
can be used as evidence of various kinds of original intent or, in the term
preferred by the new textualists, meaning-specific, general, and semantic.
Are the new textualists consigned to formalist hell because they can point to
no authoritative reason for their discriminating practice toward historical
materials?
Several other bases, not yet invoked by the new textualists, potentially
support their practice of ignoring statutory legislative history but carefully
considering constitutional drafting history and ratification debates.7 These
reasons are suggested by the structural differences between ordinary statutes
and the extraordinary Constitution: the former are much easier to amend
than the latter, and an ongoing institution, namely Congress, is charged with
the former's updating.
Because constitutive documents deliberately are made hard to change,
the Constitution is more open-textured, abstract, and process-oriented than
statutes. Original context is more useful, and even necessary, for interpreta-
tion of such an ancient document than for interpretations of the more
targeted, concrete, and substantive statutes, most of which have been enacted
or comprehensively revised in the last couple of generations. Moreover, be-
cause statutes are easier to change than the Constitution, a judicial interpre-
tation that slights legislative expectations does potentially less harm than one
that slights constitutional expectations.
Both legislative history and constitutional history are strategic: players
make statements with an eye on how other people will respond to them. In
this century, legislative history has become strategic in another way: players
4 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621, 666 (1991).
5 See infra notes 10-59 and accompanying text.
6 See infra notes 60-85 and accompanying text.
7 See infra notes 86-106 and accompanying text.
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make statements with an eye on how judges will construe their statutes. Leg-
islative history, therefore, has become less revealing of original deals. More-
over, the Court has an obligation to create rules of interpretation that
discourage this second-order strategic behavior in future Congresses. A rule
of total exclusion is the only kind of rule that might do the trick.
Because the Constitution is harder to amend and the Framers were not
an ongoing institution like Congress, constitutional history is more static than
legislative history. The cost of legislative history for our system of law is
enormous and continues to grow. Once judges started citing legislative his-
tory, agencies, academics, and counsel for private parties felt compelled to
research the history. This practice in turn fuels the impulse to stuff more and
more legislative history into legislation. An exclusionary rule may be the
best way to halt this spiraling inefficiency.
These arguments are tentative, and Part III suggests problems with each
argument. All I claim is that these kinds of defenses are the best justifica-
tions for the new textualists' willingness to credit The Federalist, even as they
scorn legislative history.
I. The Apparent Inconsistency: The Federalist Yes; Legislative
History, No
Justice Scalia's Tanner Lectures at Princeton University articulate a tex-
tualist approach to statutory interpretation that is subtly but discernibly dif-
ferent from the same jurist's textualist approach to constitutional
interpretation.8 Scalia vigorously criticizes approaches to statutory interpre-
tation that focus on "legislative intent" or "just results" as their lodestar.9 He
agrees with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's comment on statutes: "I don't
care what their [the legislators'] intention was. I only want to know what the
words mean."'10
Justice Scalia contrasts his textualist philosophy with the Supreme
Court's decision in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States." In Holy
Trinity Church, an 1885 statute prohibited anyone from contracting with an
"alien" to pay his transportation to the United States "to perform labor or
service of any kind."'12 The statute excepted from its prohibition actors, lec-
turers, and domestic servants.13 Although Holy Trinity Church had paid the
way for Reverend E. Walpole Warren to come to the United States to serve
as pastor of its congregation, the Supreme Court in 1892 created an addi-
tional exception to the statutory prohibition for Christian ministers and, in
dictum, for other "brain toilers.' 1 4 The Court conceded that the church's
8 Justice Scalia's Tanner Lectures were published with commentaries and responses by
the author as ANToNIN SCALiA ET AL., A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE LAW (1997).
9 Scalia, supra note 1, at 16-23.
10 See id. at 22-23 (Scalia endorsing Oliver Wendell Holmes' view of statutory
interpretation).
11 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
12 Id at 458.
13 See id. at 458-59.
14 See id. at 464.
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importation of Warren fell within the plain meaning of the statute, accepting
arguendo that a minister is performing "labor" or "service" of some kind.15
The Court departed from the statutory plain meaning to accommodate the
statute's purpose, or "spirit," as Justice David Brewer's evangelical opinion
put it.16 Scalia argues that this reasoning was backwards: "Well of course I
think that the act was within the letter of the statute, and was therefore
within the statute: end of case.' 17
The Court in Holy Trinity Church divined the statutory spirit, in part,
from committee reports accompanying the 1885 legislation.'8 The reports as-
serted that the proposed law was only aimed at manual workers and not
"brain toilers."'19 The report of the Senate committee lamented that the limi-
tation would have been more explicit had there been time for amendment. 20
From Scalia's point of view, the Court's invocation of legislative history com-
pounds the Court's error in departing from textual plain meaning. "My view
that the objective indication of the words, rather than the intent of the legis-
lature, is what constitutes the law leads me, of course, to the conclusion that
legislative history should not be used as an authoritative indication of a stat-
ute's meaning."'21
Elsewhere in the lecture, Scalia argues that statutory legislative history is
an unreliable and excessively costly basis for gauging legislative intent.22
Even if there were such a thing as "legislative intent," the debating history of
statutes would not accurately reflect it. Even if legislative history could
sometimes reveal a legislative intent not revealed by the text of the statute,
the overall costs of such research to the legal system greatly outweigh its
potential benefits. Scalia indicates that one of the costs of legislative history
is that it increases the range of judicial discretion. "In any major piece of
legislation, the legislative history is extensive, and there is something for eve-
rybody. As Judge Harold Leventhal used to say, the trick is to look over the
heads of the crowd and pick out your friends." 23
In a brief concluding section, the Tanner Lectures criticize theories of
the "Living Constitution.' 24 The goal of constitutional interpretation, Scalia
says, is to determine "the original meaning of the text."25 To accomplish that,
Scalia insists that contemporary sources, including and especially Hamilton's
and Madison's writings in The Federalist, be consulted.26 Although he denies
any material difference, Scalia's position on constitutional interpretation is
differently focused from his position on statutory interpretation. If the for-
15 See id. at 458-59.
16 See id. at 459 ("It is a familiar rule, that a thing may be within the letter of the statute,
because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its makers.").
17 Scalia, supra note 1, at 20.
18 See Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 464-65.
19 See id.
20 See id. at 464.
21 Scalia, supra note 1, at 29-30.
22 See id. at 31-37.
23 Id. at 36.
24 See id. at 41-47.
25 Id. at 45.
26 See id. at 38.
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mer seeks out the "original meaning of the text" and emphasizes then-con-
temporary understanding of the words of the Framers, the latter denies
relevance to contemporary legislative debates and says, "I don't care what
[the legislators'] intention was. I only want to know what the words mean."
Although both are text-based approaches, the former suggests a more histori-
cist focus in constitutional cases, the latter a more semantic one in statutory
cases.
This close examination of the Tanner Lectures suggests the hypothesis
that Scalia's textualism is more semantic and less historicist in statutory cases
than it is in constitutional cases. To illustrate this potential nuance, it is help-
ful to contrast Scalia's constitutional analysis in Printz v. United States,27
where he wrote for the Court to invalidate the Brady Act's requirement that
local law enforcement officers help administer the federal law's background
checks, with his statutory analysis of the imported pastor issue in Holy Trinity
Church.
In Printz, Scalia found "no constitutional text speaking to this precise
question," whether the federal government was prohibited from comman-
deering state or local law enforcement officers to help administer a federal
statutory scheme.28 Although the normal rule in the absence of a "constitu-
tional text speaking to this precise question" is that Congress can regulate
issues within its constitutional jurisdiction, such as interstate commerce,
Scalia found a constitutional limitation in "the historical understanding and
practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this
Court."29 To determine the historical understanding and practice, Scalia re-
lied strongly on The Federalist.30 The contrast between Scalia's methodology
in Printz and his analysis of Holy Trinity Church is striking and can be
generalized.
Scalia's inquiry in Printz is strongly historical, asking the question, What
did this text signify to people of the time? In contrast, Scalia's analysis of
Holy Trinity Church, which construed a 100-year-old statute, is completely
ahistorical and shows no interest in what the statutory command-not to im-
port aliens for "labor or service of any kind"-would have meant to the peo-
ple of the time in the context of national immigration policy.31 Scholars
should be tentative about generalizations, but this contrast thus far has been
typical of Scalia's jurisprudence. His many opinions interpreting older stat-
utes show only occasional interest in how contemporaries would have under-
27 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997).
28 Id. at 2370 (Scalia, J.).
29 Id.
30 See id. at 2372-79.
31 In fact, there is good reason to think that such language in 1885 might have suggested
manual workers and not brain toilers such as the Holy Trinity pastor. Compare William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the Unknown Ideal?, 96 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming May 1998) (argu-
ing that there is some semantic ambiguity in the alien contract labor statute, given dictionary
definitions and semantic practice in 1885, when the statute was enacted), with Adrian Vermeule,
Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity
Church, 50 STAN. L. REv. (forthcoming July 1998) (arguing that there is little or no textual
ambiguity in the alien contract labor statute).
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stood the statutory terms,32 while those interpreting the Constitution
relentlessly focus on historical understanding. 33
The most striking discontinuity between Scalia's constitutional and statu-
tory analyses is the role of a provision's drafting and debating history. The
most doctrinally distinctive feature of Scalia's statutory jurisprudence is the
sweeping rejection of legislative history. Scalia almost always considers the
legislative discussion prior to a statute's enactment unworthy of discussion or
consideration. This is apparent not only in cases where Scalia writes for the
Court or dissents from the Court's judgment, but is particularly prominent in
cases where Scalia agrees with the Court's judgment. If the opinion for the
Court relies on legislative history in any way, Scalia will typically concur only
in the judgment, often with a pointed critique of the majority's misguided
reliance on legislative history. "The text's the thing. We should therefore
ignore [statutory] drafting history without discussing it, instead of after dis-
cussing it."'34 Because Scalia takes this approach even when the majority is
not invoking legislative history as authoritative, his practice is sometimes a
more thorough rejection of legislative history than that advocated in the Tan-
ner Lectures. In the 1996 Term, for example, Scalia went so far as to refuse
to join a footnote of an opinion that he otherwise joined completely. This
offending footnote merely said "[w]e give no weight to the legislative his-
tory" and briefly explained why.35
In contrast to this dismissive stance, Scalia in constitutional cases gener-
ally, and sometimes extensively, discusses the debating history of the Consti-
tution. In Printz, Scalia's opinion carefully considered and vigorously
32 Most of Scalia's celebrated statutory interpretation opinions reveal a substantial dis-
interest in historical inquiry. Compare MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 225-29 (1994) (Scalia, J.)
(mainly discussing current dictionary definitions of the term "modify" used in the Communica-
tions Act of 1934 but mentioning a pre-1934 dictionary as well), with Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 657-77 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (strongly dog-
matic view that "discriminate" as used in Civil Rights Act of 1964 includes affirmative action, but
referring to no contemporary (circa 1964) source supporting that view). Other opinions, how-
ever, are substantially interested in such historical inquiry. See, e.g., Smiley v. Citibank (South
Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 744-47 (1996) (Scalia, J.).
33 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2172-76 (1997) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (Scalia, J.); Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 413 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
34 Bank One Chicago, N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264,283 (1996) (Scalia,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (recognizing federal court jurisdiction
over interbank disputes). For additional concurring opinions authored by Justice Scalia, see, for
example., Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200, 219 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Thompson/
Center Arms Co., 504 U.S. 505, 519 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring); Begier v. IRS, 496 U.S. 53, 67
(1990) (Scalia, J., concurring); Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S. 617, 631 (1990) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring); Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); Green v. Bock
Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504,527 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); United States v. Taylor, 487
U.S. 326, 344 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 452 (1987)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
35 Associates Commercial Corp. v. Rash, 117 S. Ct. 1879, 1882 n.* (1997) (holding credi-
tor's bankruptcy claim was limited to value of collateral). Scalia joined the entire opinion except
for footnote four. Note that Thomas joined the Court's opinion without this reservation.
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disputed the dissenters' deployment of The Federalist to support their view
that the Constitution says nothing about commandeering, even in the much-
invoked but ultimately truistic Tenth Amendment, and also requires federal
statutes to be the "supreme law of the land," binding directives for state ad-
ministrators as well as state judges.36 In Scalia's view, the Framers and most
of the public assumed that the federal government did not have the power to
deploy state officials to carry out federal statutory schemes.37 Scalia's opin-
ion affirmatively relied on The Federalist to establish that the Constitution
was meant to prohibit such deployment, both as specifically understood by at
least one framer38 and as generally understood from the constitutional princi-
ple or spirit of dual sovereignty. 39 Printz is a high-water point for Scalia's use
of The Federalist, because the specific constitutional texts of the Commerce
Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Supremacy Clause sup-
ported the dissenters and had to be explained away. Scalia's previous consti-
tutional opinions have often and enthusiastically invoked those sources.40
The views and practices I have attributed to Justice Scalia are not com-
pletely applicable to Justice Thomas, who has often but not always joined
Scalia's attacks on statutory legislative history. Thomas is, moreover, an even
more enthusiastic consumer of pre-enactment sources in constitutional cases.
For an example of the former point, Thomas recently wrote the opinion for
the Court in National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank &
Trust Company.41 As to the issue of whether the respondent banks fell
within the "zone of interests" meant to be protected by the Federal Credit
Union Act, Thomas focused on the statutory plain meaning, which he found
supported by the legislative history.42 Scalia joined the rest of the opinion
but pointedly refused to join the footnote relying on legislative history as
secondary support for the Court's holding.4 3 As to the merits of the case,
Thomas emphasized only textual arguments and found the legislative history
too "murky" to be relevant.44
The best example of Thomas's enthusiasm for pre-enactment constitu-
tional materials is his dissenting opinion in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thorn-
ton.45  Thomas canvassed The Federalist and other sources of the
Constitution's drafting and ratification debates to argue that Arkansas re-
tained the authority to impose term limits on its representatives to Con-
36 Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2373-75 (1997) (Scaia, J.).
37 See id.
38 Scalia named Madison even if not Hamilton, who was an unrepresentative Framer on
this issue, in Scalia's view.
39 See id. at 2376-79 (determining "essential postulate[s]" of the Constitution, Justice
Scalia invoked The Federalist ten times, five of which were direct quotes).
40 See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995) (Scalia, J.); Morrison v.
Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697-99 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
41 66 U.S.L.W. 4134 (U.S. Feb. 25, 1998) (Nos. 96-843 and 96-847)
42 See id. at 4138 n.6.
43 See id. at 4135 n.*. Because the Court was divided 5-4, Scalia's refusal to join the foot-
note meant that Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court for all issues except for those ad-
dressed in footnote six. See id. at 4135.
44 See id. at 4141 n.10. Scalia joined note 10.
45 514 U.S. 779, 845-926 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Scalia joined this dissent. See id.
at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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gress.46 The opening portion of the dissenting opinion argued that, because
the national government exists only with the consent of the state govern-
ments, the states presumptively retain any sovereign authority not expressly
denied them by the Constitution itself.47 Although this argument was said to
be derived from the structure of the Constitution, Thomas's key evidence-
his smoking gun-was Madison's The Federalist No. 39, which said that the
consent upon which the Constitution's authority rests was "given by the peo-
ple, not as individuals composing one entire nation, but as composing the
distinct and independent States to which they respectively belong. '48
Throughout his dissenting opinion, Thomas relied on The Federalist and
other reports of the state ratification debates to make his case for the reten-
tion of state authority and to refute the majority's use of such evidence to
suggest that the Framers assumed the states did not retain such authority.49
Particularly for Scalia and more weakly for Thomas, the new textualist
practice reveals more strikingly the tension suggested in the Tanner Lectures:
the biggest consumers of The Federalist and other pre-enactment constitu-
tional history will not even read pre-enactment legislative history of statutes.
This initially strikes me as a serious inconsistency. All of Scalia's criticisms of
legislative history apply, at least superficially, to The Federalist, which (like
legislative history) is not the "words" of the law, takes positions on issues
that the drafters of the Constitution did not think about, and was not read by
either the drafters or most of the delegates ratifying the Constitution outside
New York. Indeed, the skeptical approach Scalia takes to statutory drafting
and debating history would at first glance appear to justify a much more
skeptical approach to constitutional drafting and debating history. Upon
more systematic consideration of Scalia's approach, the problem becomes
even clearer.
1. If the collective "intent" of the bicameral legislature is an incoherent
concept, as the new textualists argue, the collective "understanding" of an
entire nation during a constitutional moment must be even more so. After
all, a statute running the legislative gauntlet only has to satisfy some portion
of the 536 participants (President, 100 Senators, 435 House Members) in the
process. The Constitution itself ran the gauntlet of the Philadelphia Conven-
tion and thirteen state ratifying conventions, involving thousands of people.
The national "understanding" of what the Constitution meant involved mil-
lions.50 Many of these millions were illiterate; and, even during constitutional
moments, many of them were uninterested in what was transpiring in Phila-
delphia. How can a doubting Thomas (or Scalia) as to coherent legislative
intent be a true believer in the collective understanding at the national level?
46 See id. at 845-926 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
47 See id. at 845-46 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 243 (James
Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)). To support this key evidence, Thomas also invoked
Madison's comments at the Virginia ratifying convention and the drafting history of the Consti-
tution itself. See id. at 846 n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
49 See id. at 878-81, 881 nn.17-18, 887-90, 890 n.20, 892-95, 898 n.23, 899-904, 909-13
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
50 Even if you don't count women, people of color, and people without property.
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2. The Federalist is not necessarily more reliable than statutory legislative
history in discerning usable collective understanding; in some respects, it may
be less reliable.
(a) The Federalist's assertions are not necessarily representative of the
views of others or even of their own authors. The authors of The Federalist
wrote the essays for just one state's ratifying convention, New York's. No
historian has rigorously established that the arguments therein were known
and accepted in any other state, or even for that matter in New York.5'
Although Madison, whom Scalia and Thomas overwhelmingly cite, was also a
key player at the Philadelphia Convention and the Virginia ratifying conven-
tion, his views are not any more representative of a collective understanding
than the views of a legislative sponsor or a committee during congressional
deliberations prior to enactment of a statute-unless Madison receives some
special status because he was a Framer.5 2 Because they were propaganda
documents, seeking (often disingenuously) to rebut the arguments of the
Anti-Federalists, some historians are reluctant to conclude that The Federalist
even honestly reflects the views of Madison and Hamilton themselves.53
(b) The Federalist cannot be understood without exploring the larger his-
torical context. Even if Madison's and Hamilton's essays were not strategic
documents and were representative views of citizens at the time, scholars
must refer to other contemporary documents and current theories of the ide-
ological debate during the founding period to understand the essays' mean-
ings. This would involve mastery of a massive body of scholarship that is not
evidenced by either judges or many law professors at this time.54 In Printz,
for example, Justices Scalia and Souter sparred over the proper construction
of Hamilton's The Federalist No. 27. Souter read this essay to defend the
proposition that state officials would be "incorporated" into national pro-
grams at the discretion of Congress,55 a reading disputed by Scalia.5 6 Missing
in the heated exchange was any historical context: To what Anti-Federalist
argument was Hamilton responding? How did the argument mesh with
Hamilton's theory of state versus national sovereignty (a terribly complicated
issue but one critical to one's reading of The Federalist No. 27)? How widely
was Hamilton's theory of sovereignty held? His views about national
51 For a discussion on the essays as propaganda and the problems with generalizing them
to represent objective meaning or subjective intent, see ARTauR FURTWANGLER, THE AUTHOR-
ITY OF PUBLIUS: A READING OF THE FEDERAUST PAPERS (1984).
52 Scalia objects to Madison's receiving any special status. See Scalia, supra note 1, at 38.
He says Jay is just as credible as Madison even though Jay was not at Philadelphia. See id.
Although he has cited Jay's essays occasionally, I cannot name a single case in which Scalia used
Jay as key support.
53 Typically in the hard constitutional cases, like Printz and U.S. Term Limits, the debating
documents lead in many different directions because they were drafted by different people who
saw matters differently. As to the issue of retained state power and governmental autonomy, for
example, Hamilton and Madison disagreed, as Scalia suggested in Printz. See Printz v. United
States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2375 n.9 (1997).
54 The scholarship is impressively surveyed, analyzed, and made relevant to originalist de-
bates in Martin S. Flaherty, History "Lite" in Modem American Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L.
REv. 523 (1995).
55 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2402 & n.1 (Souter, J., dissenting).
56 See id. at 2375 n.9 (Scalia, J.).
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supremacy? The Justices did not address the primary documents and histori-
ographical literature addressing these issues.
(c) The issues the authors of The Federalist need to address tend to be
counterfactual situations the authors did not anticipate. Because it was writ-
ten 200 years ago, and because the Constitution and the nation have deci-
sively evolved in ways the authors did not anticipate, The Federalist operates
upon assumptions that long ago died. To take the Printz issue, why should
the views of Madison, who would have found the modem regulatory state
inconceivable, offer guidance as to issues of modem administration, once the
nature of government has changed so much?
3. To support firm normative conclusions based on history is attractive,
but it is often impossible to do so in ways that satisfy professional standards
of historiography. For this reason, the originalist evidence does not provide
any greater interpretive closure-and hence does not constrain willful
judges-in constitutional cases than it does in statutory cases. The majority
opinion in U.S. Term Limits and the chief dissenting opinion in Printz, both
written by Justice John Paul Stevens, the new textualists' leading counter-
point on the current Court, meet and arguably refute every historical argu-
ment made by Justice Thomas in U.S. Term Limits and Justice Scalia in
Printz.57 As the commandeering and term limits cases reveal, The Federalist,
the records of the Philadelphia Convention, the records of the state ratifying
conventions, and other sources still being published, provide "a uniquely
broad playing field" of evidence as to contemporary understandings, and
"there is something for everybody. As Harold Leventhal used to say, the
trick is to look over the heads of the crowd and pick out your friends."5 8
Legal historians have passed harsh judgment on the Court's ability to ap-
proach historical, founding-era materials with the degree of professional de-
tachment and thoroughness that would allow Scalia and Thomas to escape
the Leventhal observation.5 9
II. False Start: The New Textualists' Unpersuasive Justification for
Treating Background History Differently in Constitutional
and Statutory Cases
From the foregoing discussion, it might appear that a jurist can and
should consult both The Federalist and statutory legislative history cautiously
and nondogmatically, 60 or should refuse to consider either because they are
57 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2387-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting); U.S. Tern Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). I take no position as to who got it "right" in those cases, but the
academic commentary generally agrees with Stevens and Souter. See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson,
Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: A Matter of Printziple?, 111 HARV. L. REv. (forth-
coming June 1998). Even some strongly conservative originalists have agreed with Souter's and
Stevens' reading of the evidence. See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79
VA. L. REv. 1957 (1993) (closely anticipating Souter's dissent).
58 Scalia, supra note 1, at 36.
59 See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 54, at 552-54.
60 See, e.g., John Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv.
673 (1997) (posing sophisticated formalist argument for a textual approach to statutory interpre-
tation, but one that only denies legislative history "authoritative" value).
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too unreliable or manipulable. There is no initially apparent functional rea-
son to consider only one and not the other. Nor does a plausible formalist
reason leap to my mind. As to this latter point, the Constitution may require
a different approach to statutory interpretation than it requires for its own
construction. Such a view faces one formal obstacle: the Court's authority to
interpret statutes and to invalidate unconstitutional laws derives from the
same constitutional source-Article III's conferring of the "judicial Power"
on the Court to hear various kinds of cases and controversies. It is not imme-
diately apparent how a constitutional formalist can justify reading the "judi-
cial Power" differently in statutory interpretation and in constitutional cases.
It is also unclear that contemporaries viewed statutory and constitutional
methodologies as materially different. 61 Although Scalia has argued that his
methodology is supported by the constitutional principle against delegation
of lawmaking authority to legislative subgroups, that argument cannot be sus-
tained generally. 62 Even friendly commentators find Scalia's reasoning to be
an insufficient basis to prohibit all reference to legislative history.63
Scalia has also suggested that the Constitution's separation of powers
and the need to control judicial discretion supports his never-look-at-legisla-
tive-history position,64 but such an argument applies with greater force to
question the new textualists' use of The Federalist. If the use of background
history tends to increase judicial discretion, as Scalia charges, it is more wor-
risome in constitutional cases than in statutory cases. It is most dangerous
when Justices invoke background history to create a constitutional limitation
not apparent from the plain language of the Constitution, as Scalia did in
Printz. Congress can and often does override willful judicial constructions of
statutes, but it usually cannot override willful judicial constructions of the
Constitution. If judicial activism-substituting judicial for legislative re-
sults-is presumptively suspect, then it is the constitutional and not the statu-
tory interpreter who should be especially chary of relying on debating
history.
Indeed, the debating history seems more relevant for interpreting re-
cently enacted statutes, in which the legislative expectations relate to our cur-
rent world. The history addresses issues sometimes still alive. By contrast,
the expectations for the grand old Constitution relate to a long-departed
world and address issues typically dead or altered by changed circumstances.
This point has a normative dimension as well. Debating history or general
61 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIsT No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
62 See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 650-56 (refuting Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legis-
lative History Presented at Various Law Schools, 1985-86 (unpublished speech, on file with the
University of Virginia Law Review)). Scalia argues from Article I, § 7 and INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919 (1983), that the views of legislative committees and sponsors cannot be viewed as bind-
ing on Congress as a whole. This argument fails for various reasons, including the fact that the
limitations in Article I do not prohibit the Supreme Court from considering internal legislative
materials under Article III.
63 See Manning, supra note 60, at 731-33 ("Even if the constitutional structure precludes
legislative agents from declaring legislative intent, nothing prohibits them, in principle, from
using legislative history to record evidence of meaning that they have not concocted simply to
influence judicial interpretation and determine statutory meaning.").
64 See Scalia, supra note 1, at 35.
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background surrounding the Constitution adds context that is substantively
slanted, not just toward federalism values in ways that the Reconstruction
Amendments sought to offset, but also systematically against the interests of
people of color (constitutional slaves in 1789), women (legal servants), poor
people (nonvoters), and religious and social nonconformists (social outcasts).
Subsequent amendments and judicial constructions have sought to amelio-
rate these contexts of constitutional law. This is a disturbing feature of the
new textualism's seemingly incoherent treatment of constitutional and statu-
tory debating history and makes it all the more urgent that they justify their
stance.
The closest the new textualists have come to defending the apparent in-
coherence is Scalia's assertion in the Tanner Lectures that he consults
Madison's and Hamilton's essays in The Federalist "not because they were
Framers and therefore their intent is authoritative and must be the law; but
rather because their writings, like those of other intelligent and informed
people of the time, display how the text of the Constitution was originally
understood. '65 Scalia's reasoning is a weak justification for consulting The
Federalist and is no reason to distinguish The Federalist and other pre-ratifica-
tion constitutional sources from committee reports and other pre-enactment
statutory sources.
Scalia's sharp distinction between consulting background history such as
The Federalist because it is "authoritative" (not permissible) as opposed to
because it "displays how the text of the Constitution was originally under-
stood" (permissible and indeed required) is questionable. If there is any
practical distinction between an "authoritative" source and a source that
"displays how the text of the Constitution was originally understood," it is a
fine one. 66 Thomas's use of Madison's The Federalist No. 39 at the beginning
of his U.S. Term Limits dissent appears to be using Madison as an authority,
just as it appears to Scalia, who joined the dissent without cavil, to have been
evidence of original understanding. Thomas argued that the Constitution
was not a social contract among the people of the United States, but among
the United States.67 The Preamble and the Tenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution refer to "the people," which Thomas read to mean only "the people of
the respective states. '68 His most direct argument for that proposition was
his quotation from The Federalist No. 39.69 For this proposition, central to his
dissenting opinion, he cited no one else beyond Madison and gave no reason
65 Scalia, supra note 1, at 38.
66 If Scalia means to say that he will not treat The Federalist as "law," he is making a
trivial point that no one disputes. In addition, defenders of legislative history, who treat commit-
tee reports and the like as evidence of how the "law" (the statute) should be applied in a particu-
lar case concede this point.
67 See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 845-926 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
68 See id at 846 & n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
69 Thomas led with another argument, that Article VII provided for the Constitution to
take effect among only the States that ratified it, so that it did not bind the people of North
Carolina until the state ratified the Constitution. See id. at 846 (Thomas, J., dissenting). This
point is not as direct an argument as The Federalist No. 39. Article VII also precluded the
Constitution from having any force until nine States ratified it, suggesting that there was a na-
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to believe anyone else of the time accepted this view, aside from the implicit
argument that if Madison believed it it must be right.70
As the foregoing example suggests, the best and perhaps only persuasive
reason to suppose that Madison's Federalist essays provide any evidence as to
"how the text of the Constitution was originally understood" derive from the
"authority" of Madison as a key framer: what he said is uniquely well-in-
formed, because he was a frequent and influential speaker at the Philadel-
phia Convention, took extensive notes which have been our best evidence of
the Convention debates, and participated in the ratification debates of New
York and Virginia; and what he said was of special significance because he
was a spokesman for the Federalists seeking ratification of the Constitution.
For precisely the same reasons-unique knowledge and representativeness-
committee reports and sponsor statements are the most useful legislative his-
tory of statutes.
Scalia's effort to differentiate the use of legislative history when inter-
preting statutes from the use of The Federalist when interpreting the Consti-
tution amounts to little more than a language game: the former is assertedly
used as authority, which is questionable, and the latter is used as only evi-
dence, which is okay. In practice, legislative history and The Federalist are
deployed in similar ways: as persuasive evidence of original understanding.
Conventions that make it reasonable to suppose that certain focal speakers
reflect more than their own views when they make statements in the course
of public constitutional or statutory debates contribute to the persuasive
quality of this evidence.
Holy Trinity Church, which Scalia criticizes for relying on legislative his-
tory as evidence of legislative intent, and Printz, in which Scalia relies heavily
on The Federalist as evidence of the original understanding, can be viewed as
analytically similar. In both cases, the authoritative text did not readily sup-
port the result reached by the Court. Brewer conceded-too readily, in my
view-that the broadly drafted exclusionary statute contained no exception
for ministers.71 Scalia pointed to no provision of the Constitution that pro-
hibits the national government from commandeering state officials. 72 In both
cases, the Court looked to contextual evidence to tease out a limitation not
found in the plain language of the document. Brewer invoked the title of the
act, contemporary accounts of the statute's goal, and committee reports la-
menting that the bill was drafted more broadly than was needed to get at the
evil addressed as evidence of legislative "intent. '73 Scalia invoked The Feder-
alist and early practice as evidence of "original understanding." 74 In both
cases, the Court clinched its argument with invocation of constitutional prin-
ciple: Brewer's ode to the Christian Nation and Scalia's ode to federalism.75
tional as well as state feature to "the people." This stipulation violated the Articles of Confeder-
ation, which required unanimous state consent for amendment or, presumably, supersession.
70 See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
71 See Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 458-59 (1892).
72 See Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 2365, 2370 (1997).
73 See Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 462-65.
74 Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2372-74.
75 See Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 465-71; Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2376-79.
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Scalia deploys a language game in which users of legislative history are
looking for a "legislative intent," which is labeled subjective and unknow-
able, while users of The Federalist are looking for an "original understand-
ing," which is labeled objective and knowable. What Brewer called
legislative intent in Holy Trinity Church and Scalia called original under-
standing in Printz is much the same inquiry. Both consider how a reasonable
participant in the process would have expected the inquiry to be resolved
given the values, representations, and deals made in the process of adopting
the legal document. The reasonable participant is himself a product of con-
ventions linking received meaning to intended meaning. If a key member of
the majority coalition, such as Senator Blair or James Madison, defended the
text propounded by the coalition in a certain way, we conventionally pre-
sume that the import of what he was saying was widely understood to reflect
the import of the text adopted once the majority won enactment of its legal
document. Whether one terms the statement evidence as "legislative or
Framers' intent" or as "original understanding," the core idea is essentially
the same.
Perhaps it is contentious to quibble with my friend Scalia76 over lan-
guage and characterization. Assume that there is an important practical dis-
tinction between considering historical materials as authoritative and
considering them only as evidence of original meaning. That distinction still
would not support the new textualists' more severe distinction between con-
stitutional history, which they readily consider, and legislative history, which
Thomas considers generally beside the point and Scalia will not even read.
Legislative history's value is neither limited to, nor focused on, its authorita-
tiveness and can be valuable in no fewer than three different ways. 77
1. Background history has an authority value when the materials are
cited as independent authority for the legitimacy of a particular proposition.
The fact that a key player said thus and so is independent evidence support-
76 Although Justice Scalia and I disagree about particular issues of public law-from the
value of legislative history to the dynamics of statutory interpretation to the legitimacy of state
discriminations against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals-neither of us views the other as dis-
honest or disingenuous, the usual charges in this contentious era. I think Scalia calls his constitu-
tional and statutory shots as he sees them, and I appreciate his impolitic candor and scintillating
writing style as a welcome contrast to the public reasoning of other denizens in Spin City. Also,
I admire Scalia's devotion to and brilliant articulation of fundamental public law values, includ-
ing the importance of the rule of law, the value of following text and precedent to subserve the
rule of law, and the critical and positive role of federalism and separation of powers in our
constitutional system. Finally, it has been my pleasure to work with Scalia on a few public-
regarding projects, including a public ABA debate over the use of legislative history and a series
of annual presentations Scalia has made to my Legislation classes at Georgetown University
School of Law. The Justice is a delightful person to work with, is exceedingly generous with his
time in speaking with groups of law students and in class formats, and is analytically engaging
and refreshingly candid on legal issues of all sorts.
77 My own historical work has demonstrated that Justices have invoked legislative history
to provide linguistic context for ambiguous statutory language, to assure themselves that they
were not reading harsh consequences into statutory text without warrant, and to reinforce argu-
ments made from statutory text or precedent. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History
Values, 66 CHI.-KNrr L. Rnv. 365 (1992). Scalia's Supreme Court colleague, Stephen Breyer,
has justified legislative history consideration along precisely the same lines. See Stephen Breyer,
On the Uses of Legislative History in Construing Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992).
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hig the proposition that the document meant thus and so. Brewer in Holy
Trinity Church relied on the Senate committee report for the proposition that
the general language of the alien contract statute did not apply to contracts
bringing "brain toilers" into this country.78 Thomas in U.S. Term Limits re-
lied on The Federalist No. 39 for the proposition that the union was formed
from people of the several states and not the people generally.79 Both
Brewer and Thomas used background materials as authority for drawing par-
ticular inferences from legal documents.
2. Background history has a policy or principle value when the materials
are cited as evidence of the principles and policies subserved by the legal
document. Brewer in Holy Trinity Church relied on the House and Senate
committee reports and a judicial decision as evidence of the general purpose
of the statute, namely to prevent the flooding of domestic labor markets with
alien laborers who would undercut American wage-earners.8 0 Scalia in
Printz and Thomas in U.S. Term Limits relied on The Federalist as evidence
of the principle of state sovereign autonomy inherent in the structure of the
Constitution.8' To the extent that there is room for interpretive play or ambi-
guity in a statutory or constitutional provision, the play or ambiguity should
be resolved consistent with the policy or principle animating the document.
3. Background history has a semantic value when the materials are cited
as evidence of how terms were used and what assumptions were made in the
time of the Framers. Although Brewer in Holy Trinity Church did not ex-
amine the legislative materials for this reason, I found that the legislative
debaters used the statutory term "labor or service" more narrowly than mod-
em speakers would.82 Both the majority and dissenting Justices in Term Lim-
its invoked The Federalist as evidence as to how contemporaries would have
viewed the semantic import of the Qualifications Clauses of Article I.
The new textualists maintain that The Federalist and other background
constitutional materials are valuable for only reasons (2) and (3). They are
inadmissible if deployed for reason (1). This theory applies just as well to
statutory legislative history as to constitutional legislative history. Indeed,
Henry Hart and Albert Sacks propounded a similar theory in their influential
materials on The Legal Process.83 These scholars argued that the interpreter
should never read legislative history in isolation from the text and other legal
materials. The interpreter should consult this history only to determine the
general purpose of the statute and not to assure himself that legislators had
78 See Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 464-65.
79 See U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846.
80 See Holy Trinity Church, 143 U.S. at 463-65 (relying on district court's opinion address-
ing the importation of cheap labor and legislative reports indicating that foreign manual labor
was the problem the statute addressed).
81 See Printz, 117 S. Ct. at 2372; U.S. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 846.
82 The legislators' discussion of the workers affected by the statute focused only on blue
collar or manual workers and never referred to professional or religious workers. See, e.g., 16
CONG. REc. 1781-82 (1885) (statement of Sen. Platt); id. at 1634 (statement of Sen. Sherman); id.
at 1676 (statement of Sen. Blair).
83 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 1253-54 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994).
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anticipated the precise interpretive problem and resolved it in a particular
way.84 Under such a theory, the legislative materials were admissible in Holy
Trinity Church and could support the Court's interpretation to allow an ex-
ception for the minister.85
III. A Better Justification, Based Upon Structural Difference
Between the Constitution and Statutes
The new textualists are out-of-the-closet formalists, but their formalist
reasons for distinguishing between legislative history and The Federalist are
unpersuasive. The new textualists are also amateur historians. Professional
historians, however, are not supportive of the new textualist project of focus-
ing constitutional but not statutory law on drafting and debating histories. At
least one of the new textualists, Scalia, is a dedicated institutionalist,8 6 and it
is with institutionalist theory that the new textualists have their best argu-
ments for distinguishing The Federalist from legislative history.
Ordinary statutes and the extraordinary Constitution are structurally dif-
ferent legal instruments. Statutes are much easier to amend than the Consti-
tution, and an ongoing institution, Congress, is charged with statutory
maintenance. From this simple structural difference flow other differences
that might justify the Court's taking a different approach to background doc-
uments, and perhaps even adopting an exclusionary approach to legislative
history simultaneous with an embracing approach to The Federalist. I am not
completely persuaded of the new textualist position even under this better
line of analysis, but neither am I persuaded that it is wrong.
A. The Level of Actual or Potential Constraint Against Judicial Tyranny
Because the Constitution is a constitutive document deliberately made
hard to change, the language is more open-textured, abstract, and process-
oriented than that of statutes. Although detail and micromanagement are
not beneath the Constitution, the details that have lasted are those relating to
the structure, procedure, and rules of government, but not to its substance.87
The Constitution's precise resolution of substantive issues, especially slavery
and the sale of alcohol, has been notoriously unsuccessful. More successful
have been the open-textured constitutional provisions assuring us of due pro-
cess, equal protection, and free speech and religion.
The open-textured provisions of the Constitution have all the virtues of
flexibility. They do not box the country into substantive policies that become
ruinous as the world and the country change. These provisions also have all
the vices of flexibility. They provide neither guidance to the citizenry as to
exactly what our rights are, nor any obvious limit on judicial discretion to
implement judges' own personal policies. If the constitutional text is not par-
ticularly constraining, what is available to prevent tyranny from an unelected
84 See HART & SACKS, supra note 83, at 1253-54.
85 See Eskridge, supra note 31.
86 Scalia is one of the Court's five alumni of Henry Hart's and Albert Sacks's course on
"The Legal Process," and enjoyed a warm friendship with Sacks after law school.
87 See JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
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judiciary? One candidate, and the one emphasized in The Federalist No. 78,
is common law style precedent. This constraint is not only soft8s but is gener-
ated by the very judiciary the law needs to limit. Another candidate is origi-
nal intent or original meaning.89 If it is true, as originalists believe, that these
materials can narrow the range of interpretive debate, the materials can con-
strain judges. Although some statutes such as the Sherman Act and section
1983 are open-textured like the Constitution, most are relatively detailed.
The most detailed statutes are usually implemented by executive or in-
dependent agencies charged with their updating. Congress then keeps an eye
on agency evolution of statutes and their continuing fit with the nation's
problems. For detailed statutes, there is plenty of text for the Court to figure
out what the rule of law requires. For vague or ambiguous statutes imple-
mented by agencies, the Court defers to agency implementation, which usu-
ally yields better and more legitimate policies than the Court could. For
vague or ambiguous statutes implemented by the Court, the common law is
usually available to fill in details.
The baseline rule might be that drafting and debating history should be
avoided in the interpretation of public law. Statutes, agency rules, and con-
stitutions should all presumptively be construed according to their plain
meanings, with the common law and other specialized practice available for
gap-filling. A rule of necessity offers a reason to depart from this presump-
tion when interpreting the open-textured constitutional provisions, for other-
wise these sources of law that offer the greatest risk of judicial mischief
would be limited by the fewest sources of legal constraint.
There are several troubling objections to such a rule-of-necessity argu-
ment. One argument is Scalia's own position that allowing reference to ex-
trinsic materials increases the discretion of willful judges.90 The proposition
strikes me as generally unsupportable, though it may sometimes be true. The
truly willful judge will be unconstrained in most contexts, and the moderately
willful judge surely will not be less constrained by the vague constitutional
texts than she would be by those texts plus constitutional ratification his-
tory.91 Stephen Ross and Daniel Tranen argue, from the experience of con-
sidering parole evidence in contract law, that extrinsic evidence is both
valuable and constraining in construing legal documents. 92 I should pre-
sumptively think their point equally valid in constitutional as well as statutory
cases.
Another objection is more weighty, in my view. Judicial consideration of
originalist materials would seem to have a conservative bias, and the bias is
especially apparent in constitutional cases, because the key provisions are all
88 Every first year law student can distinguish any precedent.
89 Recall that Scalia and Thomas object to original intent and only recognize original
meaning. Other originalists prefer original intent or original understanding. I have no prefer-
ence as to, terminology.
90 See Scalia, supra note 1, at 36.
91 See, e.g., Patricia Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Constru-
ing Statutes in the 1988-89 Term of the U.S. Supreme Court, 39 Am. U. L. Rn-v. 277,304-05 (1990).
92 Stephen F. Ross & Daniel Tranen, The Modem Parole Evidence Rule and Its Implica-
tions for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming Oct. 1998).
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more than 100 years old and were adopted by politics that excluded most
American citizens from political participation. I am personally undecided as
to the importance of this objection, 93 but note at least one potentially power-
ful response to it. New textualism offers the possibility that statutes will be
freer than constitutional provisions to evolve dynamically. Dynamic evolu-
tion of statutes is defensible, especially where the dynamism is at the hands
of agencies, which are more democratically accountable to the President and
Congress than are courts. A stagnant Constitution might be safer than a dy-
namic one. Too much rights enforcement is hard for the political process to
correct because correction requires a constitutional amendment. Too little
rights enforcement is easier to correct and usually can be achieved through
ordinary legislation. Also, if the United States truly is a well-functioning de-
mocracy, a less frequently deployed Constitution places more serious respon-
sibility on the political process to consider rights when it imposes duties.
B. Reliability of the Discourse
Both legislative history, such as committee reports and sponsor state-
ments, and constitutional history, such as The Federalist, are strategic. Public
actors make statements with an eye on how other people will respond to the
statements. This strategic dimension of background history contributes to
the reliability of statements by key players that are made on the public record
in the course of debate. When key players make statements describing the
purpose and effect of the proposed law or constitutional provision, they real-
ize that people will believe they are speaking for the coalition seeking adop-
tion of the provision, and are representing all members of the coalition. The
key players, therefore, have incentives to represent the commonly held views
as faithfully as they can, lest they lose parts of the coalition.
When the debate over adoption or ratification is sharply divided, oppo-
nents also make statements attacking the proposed provision. Their strategic
statements are worth little in understanding the provision if it is adopted,
because their incentives are to exaggerate and distort the meaning and effect
of the provision. But responses by key supporters to opponents' attacks,
such as The Federalist and sponsor colloquies in Congress, are potentially
worth a great deal because of their strategic posture. When key supporters
respond to attacks, they are motivated to win over undecided players, with-
out alienating fellow supporters of the measure. Thus, the key players seek
out enough common ground that the proposed measure will garner majority
support. Opponents are alert to any potential inconsistency between the
sponsors' statements and the plain meaning of the proposed measure.
The foregoing scenario shows how public dialogue of the sort engaged in
by the authors of The Federalist and the Anti-Federalists is potentially quite
reliable for figuring out original constitutional understanding or meaning.
Whatever the man actually believed, Madison's public statements are useful
93 Compare Jed Rubenfeld, The Moment and the Millennium, 66 GEO. WASH. L. Rnv.
1085 (1998), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEo. WASH. L. REv.
1119 (1998); Michael W. McConnell, Textualism and the Dead Hand of the Past, 66 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1127 (1998).
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because he was a master politician, presenting articulate arguments that per-
suaded fence-sitters, deflated his opponents, and invigorated his allies.
Although his arguments remain useful in part because they are brilliant in-
sights into political philosophy, they are also useful because they provide a
firmer basis for understanding the ideals instinct in the Constitution that was
ultimately adopted. Hence, the willingness of Justices Stevens, Scalia, Souter,
and Thomas to debate the insights of Madison and Hamilton about comman-
deering in Printz is well-founded.
This same analysis supports the Court's consultation of statutory legisla-
tive history in Holy Trinity Church, however. Statements by sponsors and the
responsible committees were publicly available and were the basis for vigor-
ous debate, especially in the Senate during February 1885. Although the sen-
ators did not foresee the Christian minister issue, the legislative history
strikes me as reliable and useful, albeit not nearly as determinative as the
Court deemed it.94 Although legislative history was useful in Holy Trinity
Church, it might have outlived its usefulness, and for a structural reason that
was not divined by the Holy Trinity Justices.
In the wake of Holy Trinity Church and subsequent decisions expanding
the kinds of pre-enactment materials the Supreme Court is willing to con-
sider, legislative history has grown like weeds in a vacant lot. Legislators
came to realize that the audience for their public statements was not just the
other members of Congress deliberating a measure at the time, but also
judges who would interpret the measure in the future. Legislative history
became a cottage industry, and as it did so it lost some of its reliability and
usefulness. I am unable to gauge how pervasive this phenomenon has be-
come. Insiders freely acknowledge it, but most think that the new textualists
exaggerate the scope of the manipulation. 95
Legislative history in the post-New Deal era became strategic in a way it
was not before the New Deal, and in a way the pre-enactment history of the
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, and the Reconstruction Amendments were
not. Key players now make statements not only to persuade the undecided
and to reassure their allies, but also to influence judges and perhaps agency
heads in their subsequent interpretations of statutes. The currently reflexive
and self-conscious nature of "making legislative history" was largely absent
from The Federalist, the congressional discussion of the Bill of Rights, and
the debates surrounding the Reconstruction Amendments. This phenome-
non would justify a greater judicial willingness to consider constitutional
background history than to consider statutory background history. The phe-
94 The Court did no independent research into the legislative history of the 1885 statute in
that case. Its opinion simply repeated the history presented in the Church's brief, which had not
been refuted by the government's brief. My Georgetown colleague Adrian Vermeule has
demonstrated that the actual history of the legislation is much less supportive of the Court's
holding. See Vermeule, supra note 31; cf. Eskridge, supra note 31 (celebrating Vermeule's evi-
dence but finding more ambiguity in the "complete" legislative history).
95 See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MIcH. L. REv. 1, 55 (1994) ("In sum, neither the
role played by nonlegislators nor the preeminence of committees is sufficient to establish that
legislative history-including the commentary on judicial decisions-should be regarded as sys-
tematically unreliable.").
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nomenon alone would not justify a rule completely excluding the latter,
however.
The best defense for the new textualists' rule of almost total exclusion
also derives from institutional structure. Because statute-writing is an ongo-
ing enterprise by a continuous institution, Congress, the Court's approach to
interpreting previous statutes ought to have some effect on the way new stat-
utes are drafted. By considering statutory legislative history as authoritative
in Holy Trinity Church and subsequent cases, the Supreme Court induced
Congress not only to create more of it, but induced, or helped induce, this
new level of strategic behavior, in which legislative history is manufactured
by interest groups and their legislative allies, not to persuade legislators dur-
ing their deliberation, but to persuade judges down the line. Again, I cannot
gauge the significance of this phenomenon, but it has the potential for debas-
ing legislative deliberation and reducing the reliability of all legislative his-
tory. The new textualists can argue, with considerable power, that the Court
has contributed to wasteful, counterproductive, and (perhaps) even unconsti-
tutional practices in congressional deliberation. The best way for the Court
to correct the mess it has helped create would be to adopt some kind of
exclusionary rule, either Thomas's rule that judges construing statutes cannot
credit any particular statement as authority for a particular proposition or
Scalia's rule that judges construing statutes cannot credit legislative history
for any positive proposition. If either exclusionary rule were decisively
adopted by the Court,96 legislative history might return to normal, where
statements would be made as part of a deliberative process of putting to-
gether deals, reassuring allies, and winning over undecided legislators.
Because serious constitutional amending seems to have dried up after
the Progressive Era, the body of constitutional debaters exists only in the
past. Thus, for the time being, the Court's willingness to credit the explica-
tions in The Federalist poses little if any risk of corrupting future constitu-
tional conventioneers the way the Court's willingness to credit legislative
history has corrupted the ongoing process of ordinary legislation. If the as-
sumptions of the foregoing discussion are in fact true,97 the difference be-
tween constitutional discourse and legislative discourse powerfully supports a
96 As Professor Ira Lupu observed in his comment on my paper, see Ira C. Lupu, 7ime, the
Supreme Court, and The Federalist, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1310, 1324, 1325-26 (1998), the
exclusionary rule would have to be supported by a Court majority-and maybe a
supermajority-for the political process to get the clear message. It would help if the exclusion-
ary rule were announced in a "major case" that would receive media attention in any event.
97 These assumptions are plausible but not conclusively demonstrated:
1. The Court's willingness to consider pre-enactment legislative history has materially con-
tributed not only to the explosion in the amount of legislative history, but also to the debasement
of legislative history by interest groups seeking to influence judicial interpretation.
2. The legislative process does not adequately monitor the potential corruption of legislative
history by unrepresentative interest groups and allied legislators.
3. A dramatic change in the rules of statutory interpretation-from a judicial willingness to
consider almost any kind of legislative history as potentially authoritative, to a judicial exclusion
of all such evidence-would significantly ameliorate or roll back the objectionable features of
the process of second-order strategic behavior.
Some doubt about these assumptions is cast by Brudney, supra note 95, at 40-66; Ross &
Tranen, supra note 92.
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drastically different source rule for constitutional and statutory cases. The
different source rule might not be the practice of almost total exclusion as
urged by Scalia, although such a rule would send a stronger signal. A more
nuanced rule such as the one suggested at the end of Part II-that legislative
history cannot be used as authority for a particular statutory application, but
it might be guidance for the interpreter to determine the statute's purpose or
mix of purposes and to suggest how words and terms of art were used by the
contemporary regulatory community-might be more plausible.98
C. The Economics of Research
Because the Constitution is harder to amend than statutes and the Fram-
ers are not part of an ongoing institution like Congress, constitutional history
is more static than legislative history. Hence, constitutional history ought to
be cheaper to research than the ever-escalating legislative history of major
statutory schemes. For example, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
carried with it an enormous legislative history, and one that grew with sub-
stantial amendments to the statute in 1972, 1978, and 1991.99 For a Justice
interested in background evidence, such as Stevens, the legislative history of
the original statute, the 1972 amendments, the 1978 amendments, and the
1991 amendments are relevant to issues arising around disparate impact lia-
bility and affirmative action. Because Stevens and other Justices find the his-
tory relevant, lower court judges in addition to the EEOC, Department of
Justice lawyers, corporate counsel, law professors, and private attorneys must
as well. When these issues are in play, these figures have to do much more
than read the statute; they must attain some level of competence in the ever-
expanding legislative history. Thus the question arises: Is the rule of law or
democracy benefit of legislative history worth the costs of so many people
researching and arguing about it?100
Although I originally posed the question, joined by Scalia in his Tanner
Lectures, I do not know what the answer is. A tentative cost-benefit calculus
is as follows. The benefits of an exclusionary rule would be:
1. the net savings in research costs by attorneys arguing or opining about
statutory issues;101
2. the rule of law and democracy benefit, if excluding legislative history
reduces judicial discretion in statutory cases;
98 Cf Manning, supra note 60, at 731 (articulating a textualist position similar to the one in
this Article).
99 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
100 See Eskridge, supra note 4. The costs of legislative history are pervasive and potentially
large, for they include not only the effort expended by the parties and decisionmaker during
litigation, but also research by private attorneys rendering routine client letters, agencies decid-
ing what regulatory options they have, and legislative staff trying to figure out what has been
resolved in prior statutes.
101 By net savings, I mean the following: the amount of time attorneys spend on legislative
history research and argumentation that they would not spend under an exclusionary rule, less
the additional time (if any) they would spend doing other kinds of statutory research, such as
dictionary shopping and consulting professional linguists.
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3. the rule of law and democracy benefit, if excluding legislative history
encourages the legislative process to write statutes that more transparently
reveal the deals and rules agreed upon.
Benefit (1) is potentially a very large number of dollars, because the
modern game of tracking down smoking guns in legislative history is both
widespread and expensive.10 2 I do not know how widespread the practice is,
though, and am open to Professor William Reynolds's comment that mining
legislative history is mostly an inside-the-beltway game. Also, if lawyers for
agencies and big companies cannot mine legislative history, they will mine
dictionaries, the United States Code, and other textualist sources, thereby
offsetting some of the gains of Benefit (1).103 Benefits (2) and (3) strike me
as virtually nil for reasons developed by Professors Abner Mikva, James
Brudney, and Stephen Ross, all of whom have participated in both the judi-
cial and legislative processes. 104
Offset against the potential benefits of an exclusionary rule are the po-
tential costs of such a rule:
1. if the new exclusionary rule were applied to existing statutes,10 5 the
rule of law, democracy, and reliance costs of negating deals made clear in the
legislative history but not in the statutory text;
2. new errors, if any, that would be introduced by excluding legislative
history, including greater need for the legislative process to sacrifice parts of
its limited agenda to monitor and respond to textualist decisions;
3. increased willingness of judges to overrule agency interpretations of
statutes, because the agency is influenced by legislative expectations that
judges think contrary to statutory text. 0 6
102 Professor Ira Lupu originally challenged the substantiality of benefit (1), on the ground
that agencies would still look at legislative history in order to please their congressional over-
seers, and private attorneys would follow agency practice. See Lupu, supra note 96.
This objection is overstated. Agencies are politically interested in the views of the current,
rather than the enacting, Congress, as only the current Congress can give them trouble in the
oversight or appropriations process. If the Court tells agencies that original legislative history is
irrelevant, agencies lose most incentives to consider it in formulating their statutory rules and
applications and all incentives to rely on such materials when private parties challenge their
interpretations. Private parties would operate under the same incentives, citing current, but usu-
ally not original legislative sentiments to politically sensitive agencies and ignoring legislative
history in their judicial challenges. By the way, notwithstanding my partial disagreement with
Lupu's objection, I do think private attorneys would continue to look at committee reports,
which are both easy to find and useful in providing context for statutory language.
103 If this is so, however, the worst (most costly) regime is the current one, where the fed-
eral appellate advocate must research all the textualist sources to please Scalian judges and all
the legislative history sources to please Stevensesque judges. This is doubly expensive, as Adrian
Vermeule pointed out to me.
104 See Brudney, supra note 95, at 40-66. Abner Mikva, Reading and Writing Statutes, 48 U.
Pr. L. REV. 627 (1987); Ross & Tranen, supra note 92.
105 Retroactive application of an exclusionary rule in this way would be unconscionable as
an unfair bait and switch on Congress. See Eskridge, supra note 4, at 683-84. The new textualists
and their academic allies seem to support it, however.
106 See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 351, 354 (1994) (examining the relationship between the Chevron doctrine and textual-
ism and determining that "textualism poses a threat to the future of the deference doctrine").
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My judgment is that cost (1) is substantial, (but could be avoided by
making the new exclusionary rule prospective in operation), and costs (2)
and (3) too speculative for even educated guesses.
For statutory legislative history the cost/benefit analysis boils down, for
now, to the following question: Are there many cases where statutory legisla-
tive history allows us to reach correct results that cannot be reached without
legislative history? There are some cases that would not have been correctly
decided without a thorough examination of legislative history, such as the
House of Lords' recent decision in Pepper v. Hart.1° 7 My judgment is that
these cases are exceptional, a judgment others should explore more systemat-
ically to determine whether our legal system would save a lot of money by
jettisoning legislative history (prospectively). Because constitutional texts are
not as detailed as statutory ones, the same calculus does not apply to consti-
tutional ratifying history.
Conclusion
Based on the second (reliability) reason adduced above, I am inclined to
the view that the Supreme Court can read and consider The Federalist even if
it refuses to do the same for statutory legislative history. The new textualists
are on firm ground in thinking that constitutional ratifying debates can be
treated differently by the Court than statutory pre-enactment debates. One
reason is the rule of necessity idea that the open-textured Constitution cries
out for more context, but I am uncertain whether The Federalist, written long
ago to a more exclusive audience, is the most appropriate source of con-
straint (though they do strike me as a most appropriate source of wisdom).
The best reason has to do with the different incentives of the speakers. Long-
departed constitutional debaters had strong incentives to represent political
consensus or equilibrium accurately. Current statutory debaters have the
same incentives, but an additional, and perhaps countervailing, incentive cre-
ated by the Court itself to bend future statutory construction toward their
preferred, rather than the actual, political equilibrium on some issues.
Because the third (cost-benefit) reason adduced above is indeterminate,
I have no firm view as to the precise approach the Court should take to legis-
lative history. Justices Scalia and Thomas themselves take slightly and per-
haps increasingly divergent approaches to legislative history. Thomas's
willingness to consider legislative history as background evidence is more
consistent with traditional practice, but Scalia's campaign against any refer-
ence to legislative history holds open the tantalizing possibility of saving the
legal system untold millions of dollars in research costs.'08 This possibility
cannot rigorously be pursued without further empirical work by the new tex-
tualists in the academy, and I urge professors and law review note writers to
pursue this agenda.
107 3 W.L.R. 1032 (H.L. 1992) (adopting use of certain legislative history in limited speci-
fied circumstances, a break with traditional English practice).
108 Costs borne, of course, by corporate clients and then consumers of their products.
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